Rights, Respect, and the Decent Society

In The Decent Society, Avishai Margalit’s contends that a good society is a decent society, a society whose institutions do not humiliate persons. However, Margalit affirms a stark distinction between the decent society and a just society. “[T]he concept of a decent society… is not necessarily connected with the concept of rights. Even a society without a concept of rights can develop concepts of honor and humiliation appropriate for a decent society.” This paper rejects this position by showing that in order for a society to be a decent society it must incorporate fundamental rights. Sections II, III, and IV examine, criticize, and reject Margalit’s arguments to the contrary, and in so doing summon arguments that demonstrate the indispensable value of fundamental rights for any society that purports to be decent. The central contention here is that only a concept of humiliation that affirms and respects fundamental rights is sufficiently robust to recognize certain violations of these rights as constituting distinctive and devastating assaults on the self-respect of specific individuals. Thus insofar as a decent society cannot countenance such assaults, a decent society must include rights.

Title	Rights, Respect, and the Decent Society
Creator	Panichas, George E.
Publisher	Journal of Social Philosophy
Date Issued	January 2000
Date Available	2023-02-06
Type	Article
Language	English
Standard Identifier	DOI 10.1111/0047-2786.00031
Standard Identifier	Handle 10385/tm70mw297
Permalink	http://hdl.handle.net/10385/tm70mw297
Rights Statement	In Copyright
Rights Holders	Wiley-Blackwell