The Basic Right to Liberty

This paper addresses the question of how the right to liberty, qua moral right, is best understood, and then how that right can serve as a basic human right of indispensable value. Section I argues that if the right to liberty is understood as a general right to license, then, as Ronald Dworkin argues, it cannot be a basic right in any morally meaningful sense. Sections II, III, and IV consider and reject the view that the right to liberty, as a basic right, comprises unrelated sets of either unilateral or bilateral liberty rights correlating with prima facie duties of non-interference. A new model of the basic right to liberty is offered in section V, and then defended in section VI. This model understands the basic right to liberty as a mutually held and reciprocally respected Hohfeldian power-right enjoyed by all basic-rights holders. In virtue of occupying the position of basic-rights holder and participation in a system of rights-permitted action and duty-required compliance or forbearance, persons come to enjoy emergent liberties that augment respect within the community and the value of having basic rights.

Title	The Basic Right to Liberty
Creator	Panichas, George E.
Publisher	Journal of Social Philosophy
Academic Department	Philosophy
Division	Humanities
Organization	Lafayette College
Date Issued	March 1990
Date Available	2023-02-07
Type	Article
Language	English
Bibliographic Citation	Panichas, George E. (1990), The Basic Right to Liberty. Journal of Social Philosophy, 21 (1): 55-76. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1990.tb00266.x
Standard Identifier	Handle 10385/j38608380
Standard Identifier	DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1990.tb00266.x
Permalink	http://hdl.handle.net/10385/j38608380
Rights Statement	In Copyright
Rights Holders	Wiley