An Idle and Most False Imposition: Truth-Seeking vs. Status-Seeking and the Failure of Epistemic Vigilance

In the past few decades, a number of researchers from evolutionary psychology, developmental psychology, and cognitive science have promoted a theory suggesting that humans are naturally cautious about the information they receive. This theory, known as “epistemic vigilance,” involves the idea that we pay attention to clues that our conversation partners might be trying to deceive us and adjust our beliefs accordingly. However, despite the increasing popularity of the theory of epistemic vigilance, there is good reason to think that it cannot be true. This is because social psychology research going back over fifty years suggests that we are in fact not very good at detecting deception, honesty or competence in others. How can we make sense of the conflicting findings from these different areas of research? I suggest that the solution lies in what I term “Nietzsche’s Thesis,” which suggests that we are actually more focused on our conversation partners’ social status than their truthfulness.

Title	An Idle and Most False Imposition: Truth-Seeking vs. Status-Seeking and the Failure of Epistemic Vigilance
Creator	Shieber, Joseph
Publisher	Philosophic Exchange
Academic Department	Philosophy
Division	Humanities
Organization	Lafayette College
Date Issued	July 2023
Date Available	2023-09-29
Type	Article
Language	English
Keyword	Melville, Herman
	Epistemic Vigilance
	"The Confidence-Man"
	Nietzsche’s Thesis
Bibliographic Citation	Shieber, J. (2023 Jul) "An Idle and Most False Imposition: Truth-Seeking vs. Status-Seeking and the Failure of Epistemic Vigilance." Philosophic Exchange http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12648/10523
Standard Identifier	Handle 10385/h128ng12v
Permalink	http://hdl.handle.net/10385/h128ng12v
Rights Statement	In Copyright