Blameworthiness in strategic games

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Abstract
  • There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The
    focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through
    the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes
    properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
TitleBlameworthiness in strategic games
CreatorNaumov, P.
Tao, Jia
PublisherProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Academic DepartmentComputer Science
DivisionNatural Sciences
OrganizationLafayette College
Date Issued2019
Date Available2022-01-07
TypeArticle
LanguageEnglish
Bibliographic CitationNaumov, P. and J. Tao (2019) "Blameworthiness in strategic games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (1): 3011-3018.
Standard IdentifierDOI 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33013011
Handle 10385/8g84mn65g
Permalinkhttp://hdl.handle.net/10385/8g84mn65g
Rights Statement In Copyright In Copyright
Rights HoldersAssociation for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
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